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CON EDISON: THE CRISIS OF THE
INVESTOR-OWNED UTILITY
I. Introduction
Consolidated Edison of New York, Inc. (Con Edison) is an
investor-owned urban utility' which provides electricity to New
York City and most of Westchester County.2 It is representative
of the older investor-owned utilities which are currently in the
poorest financial condition.' Although these utilities do not serve
rapidly expanding service areas, the replacement of obsolete gener-
ating plants necessitates continued large capital expenditures.,
Present conditions raise the possibility that older investor-owned
utilities cannot survive in their present form5 of "regulated private
monopoly."'
The goal of utility regulation is to permit the utility such revenues
that:
1. Meeks, Concentration in the Electric Power Industry: The Impact
of Anti Trust Policy, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 64, 67-68 [hereinafter cited as
Concentration]. "In 1969, these investor-owned utilities served approxi-
mately eighty percent of the retail customers [nationwide]. Thirteen per-
cent of the ultimate customers were served by publicly-owned systems,
predominately relatively small municipal systems. Eight percent were
served by cooperatives, primarily rural consumers." Id.
2. Con Edison is a combination utility and it provides three services
to its customers. It provides gas to the Bronx, Manhattan, a part of
Queens, and most of Westchester county; steam to large commercial, gov-
ernment, and residential buildings in Manhattan; and electricity. 1973
CON EDISON ANN. REP. 8-11.
3. Utilities: Weak Point in the Energy Future, BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 20,
1975, at 46, 47.
4. Jones, An Example of a Regulatory Alternative to Antitrust: New
York Utilities in the Early Seventies, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 462, 525
[hereinafter cited as Regulatory Alternative]. Over 18 percent of Con
Edison's generating capacity is made up of fossil fuel plants in operation
long after they should have been retired. Id.
5. See text sections II, III, IV infra and accompanying notes.
6. Regulatory Alternative 467. See also Concentration 65. "Regulatory
practices almost uniformly reflected the traditional view that the industry
was a natural monopoly, ill-adapted to the application of antitrust princi-
ples." Id.
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after deducting all legitimate operating expenses . . . the utility will have
sufficient net earnings to provide a reasonable return on the net investment
employed in providing utility service, or, in other terms, sufficient net earn-
ings to maintain its financial integrity and attract additional capital on
reasonable terms. 7
Across the nation, public service commissions are finding it increas-
ingly difficult to realize this goal.'
The failure of Con Edison to pay a quarterly dividend on April
23, 1974 focused attention on the deteriorating financial condition
of the utility industry. Investor confidence in all utility securities
plummeted and an unprecedented plunge in the value of such secur-
ities followed.' The key to Con Edison's financial dilemma is that
revenues have not increased sufficiently to compensate for higher
operating and capital costs. While some of Con Edison's problems
are unique, its financial crisis stems from forces buffeting the entire
utility industry. This Comment will examine its problems and make
suggestions for ameliorating them.
II. The Rise in Operating Costs
The spiraling increase in Con Edison's operating costs is primarily
due to the sharply rising cost of fuel required for its generating
facilities. Other factors, such as management errors, increases in
wages, maintenance expenses, and taxes have contributed to the
rise in operating costs. Each of these areas will be examined in the
succeeding sections.
7. Regulatory Alternative 476.
8. See text section III infra.
9. Roseman, Utility Financing Problems and National Energy Policy,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 12, 1974, at 19, 25 [hereinafter cited as Utility
Financing Problems]. "While market prices drifted down during most of
1973, . . . as late as October, 1973, there were still only 25 companies
whose stocks were selling below book value. Then came the Arab oil em-
bargo, and by December of 1973, the average company's stock market price
was just below its book value, and more than half of the companies had
market prices below book value." Id. Utility stock prices were depressed
by "the passing of the dividend by Con Ed-an event which alerted many
investors to the very real possibility that not all electric utilities could be
counted on to be able to maintain, let alone increase, their dividend rates."
[Vol. III
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A. Higher Fuel Costs
In contrast to utilities which produce their power through hydro-
electric systems requiring little fuel,"0 Con Edison relies on thermal
generation which requires nuclear or fossil fuels." In 1971, New York
State and New York City anti-pollution regulations 2 compelled Con
Edison to convert its generating plants to utilize low sulfur content
oil,' 3 the bulk of which comes from the Middle East." Due to the
1973 oil embargo, the cost of residual oil for Con Edison increased
from $4.50 per barrel in the first 6 months of 1973 to $15.50 per
barrel in January, 1974.15 Combined with this increase in oil costs
10. Concentration 71. "The water from a stream or artificial lake flows
through a turbine and the force of gravity turns the turbine, converting the
energy into electricity." Id.
11. Id. at 71 n.39. "The basic technology of thermal generation involves
using one of these heat sources [fossil or nuclear fuel] to create steam in
a boiler. The steam is then released under pressure through a turbine,
converting the energy into electricity." Id.
12. The Energy Crisis-Long Range View, 1973 NEW YORK PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION ANN. REP. 11 [hereinafter cited as 1973 P.S.C. ANN.
REP.]. "The latest reduction in the allowable amounts of sulfur in fuel in
the downstate area-to 0.2 percent in New York City and Nassau County
and to 0.3 percent in other parts of the Metropolitan area-occurred Sep-
tember 30, just a few weeks before the Arab producing states . . . an-
nounced their embargo." Id.; see 6A NEW YORK, N.Y., CODE OF RULES &
REGS. part 225 (1972).
13. 1973 P.S.C. ANN. REP. 11. "New York electric utilities have become
increasingly dependent on oil-particularly No.6 residual fuel oil-since
the late 1960's. As recently as 1968, the electric utilities used coal as the
fuel for 52.39 percent of their generation, residual oil for 20.06 percent. By
1973, the ratio had been reversed: 53.89 percent for residual oil, only 20.77
percent for coal." Id.
14. Fuel Supply, 1973 CON EDISON ANN. REP. 4. The oil embargo had
particularly severe consequences for Con Edison because at that time "Con
Edison was generating about 70 percent of its electricity with low sulfur
residual oil. About 60 percent of this residual oil was produced from Mid-
east and North Africa crude. . . ." Id.
15. Id. at 5. "Altogether, fuel oil that would have cost $141 million at
1969 prices cost $292 million in 1973. If January [1974] prices prevail
throughout the year, the same amount of oil would cost more than $700
million in 1974." Id. Con Edison sought permission to burn coal and higher
sulfur content oil during the embargo, but the permission, when granted,
was too late to have an effect. Id.
19751
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was a shortage of generating capacity, forcing Con Edison to pur-
chase approximately 20 percent of its total kilowatt hour production
from other sources.' This was almost four times the amount pur-
chased in 1969.'1 The cost of fuel and purchased power was approxi-
mately 30 percent of total operating revenues. 8
In New York State, a fuel adjustment clause'" permits most gas
and electric companies automatically to pass on to consumers in-
ceases in the cost of fuel 0 The intended effect of this clause is to
relieve the pressure placed on utilities by rising fuel costs. However,
the company must finance these increasing costs from the time they
are incurred until the time they can be charged to the consumers.2'
Though this waiting period has been reduced to 40 days, such a lag
can be a fiscal nightmare in a crisis situation similar to the 1973 oil
embargo.22
16. CON EDISON-FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND OPERATING STATISTICS
1963-1973, at 8 [hereinafter cited as FINANCIAL STATEMENTS]. In 1973 Con
Ed had to purchase 7,539,702,000 kilowatt hours (KWHs) out of a total
net generated of 38,250,763,000 KWHs. Id.
17. Id. at 9. The amount of KWHs purchased in 1969 was
2,172,133,000. Id.
18. Id. at 2. Con Edison's total operating revenues for 1973 were
$1,736,239,129. Id.
19. Regulatory Alternative 491. "[T]he tariffs of most companies con-
tain provisions for automatic rate adjustments to reflect changes in the
cost of fuel or purchased gas." Id.; see 16 NEW YORK, N.Y., CODE OF RULES
& REGS. §§ 136.55-.57, 270.55-.57 (1972), for the relevant statutory provi-
sions.
20. Regulatory Alternative 491. "A cost of fuel or of purchased gas is
ascertained for a 'base period', usually the same period employed in fixing
the corresponding gas or electric rates. Each month the cost of fuel or
purchased gas is computed and electric and gas rates are adjusted to reflect
changes in fuel or purchased gas cost as compared to the base period. Id.
21. Note B-Accounting Change, 1973 CON EDISON ANN. REP. 23. "In
December 1973 the New York Public Service Commission authorized the
Company [Con Edison] to accelerate billings, commencing in January
1974, under the fuel rider provisions in its electric tariff to reduce from
approximately 60 days to approximately 40 days the delay between the
time the Company incurs increased fuel costs and the time the Company
increases its charges to customers to recover such increased costs." Id.
22. Id. Con Edison had "to defer $43,426,331 of increased fuel costs
incurred during the last 40 days of 1973." Con Edison's ability to absorb
[Vol. III
CON EDISON
B. Increases in Wages and Salaries
Increasing wages and salaries are another factor in the upward
surge of Con Edison's operating expenses. The average weekly earn-
ings of Con Edison's employees rose from $178.90 in 1969 to $260.37
in 1973.23 This expense represented about 15 percent of Con Edison's
total operating revenues in 1973.24 New contracts are due for nego-
tiation in spring, 1975.
C. Maintenance
"The electric power industry performs three basic functions: gen-
eration, transmission, and distribution of electric energy to the ulti-
mate consumer."2 Con Edison bears additional expenses because
most of its distribution and transmission system is underground.26
The construction of these underground transmission facilities is up
to 10 times as expensive as above ground facilities27 and they are
substantially more expensive to maintain.2" Thus, maintenance
such a cost, even though it will later be reimbursed by consumers, is
questionable when Con Edison is so short of cash that it is negotiating the
sale of two generating plants. See note 71 infra and accompanying text.
23. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 8-9. In 1969, Con Edison spent $172,412,563
on salary and wages, not including construction costs. In 1973, salaries and
wages cost $235,343,054. In this same five year period, Con Edison's labor
force had increased by a little over 1,000 employees. In 1969, Con Ed's
labor force totaled 23,428. By 1973, the labor force numbered 24,541. Id.
24. See note 18 supra.
25. Concentration 67. "[Llarge, bulk plants have been used to gener-
ate energy, which is then sent . . . over a transmission grid to substations,
where it is broken up into lower voltages and then fed into local distribu-
tion lines." Id.
26. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 8. In its transmission and distribution net-
work, Con Edison has 33,651 miles of overhead wire and 77,811 miles of
underground cables. See 16 NEW YORK, N.Y., CODE OF RULES & REGS.
§§100.1-.11 (1972). Section 100.4 requires that all distribution facilities
serving new apartment buildings or residential subdivisions of 5 or more
houses be placed underground.
27. Regulatory Alternative 526. Underground transmission facilities
are "about five to ten times as costly as overhead. . . ." Id.
28. Id. at 531. "Overhead lines are more exposed to weather and auto-
mobile accidents and are therefore more likely to be damaged. However,
restoration of service, except in the case of major storms, can be made
1975]
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costs in 1973 were about 9 percent of total operating revenues," and
consumed scarce financial resources needed elsewhere.
D. Taxes
Con Edison is New York City's largest taxpayer.' In 1973, Con
Edison paid $299,150,000 in local taxes as compared with
$189,892,000 in 1969.31 The total paid in general taxes32 was
$389,999,000. 33 General taxes represented about 22 percent of total
operating revenues.
3 4
E. Management
Two policies of Con Edison's management have contributed to
the company's financial troubles. The first is adherence to a tradi-
tional policy of providing power to large users for less than the
standard price .3 However, when Con Edison seeks to increose its
rates, the state's Public Service Commission (PSC) includes in its
current revenues the amount the, company would have received
from large users without this discount. 3 This conforms to the PSC
quickly. Underground lines are better protected against damaging inci-
dents; but malfunctions require more time to diagnose and remedy when
an outage occurs." Id.
29. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 2-3. The cost of maintenance in 1973 was
$161,594,756 as compared with $90,396,101 in 1969. See note 18 supra.
30. Kristol, The Mugging of Con Ed, The Wall Street Journal, May 17,
1974, at 10, col. 5. "[Ajpproximately one-third qf Con Ed's billings repre-
sent a tax on the consumer which the company surreptitiously collects for
the city. (This is distinct from, and in addition to, the taxes Con Ed pays
on its own property.)" Id.
31. 1973 CON EDISON ANN. REP. 30. This total did not include the fed-
eral income tax, state or other federal taxes. Id.
32. Id. General taxes do not include the federal income tax. They do
include city, state, and federal taxes other than the federal income tax. Id.
33. 1973 CON EDISON ANN. REP. 30. The total of general taxes paid in
1969 was $237,029,000. Id. at 31.
34. See note 18 supra.
35. This policy has been under attack and has been modified. See notes
178, 180, & 182 infra and accompanying text.
36. Regulatory Alternative 478. "Consolidated Edison typically is
charged with such revenue deficiencies in electric rate cases, [forgone as
a result of managerial discretion] because the revenues derived from spe-
cial contracts between Consolidated Edison and various government agen-
[Vol. III
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policy that "[r]evenues forgone as a result of managerial discretion
may be imputed to the utility."37 Thus, at a time when Con Edison
is in desperate need of capital it is credited with revenues it will
never receive.
The second managerial error is Con Edison's unwarranted reli-
ance on estimation of bills.38 Inaccurate estimates have increased
billing problems3" and contributed to the company's poor public
image.4 ° Investigations of complaints to Con Edison resulted in re-
funds and bill adjustments of almost $1.5 million in 1973." Billing
is a problem within Con Edison's power to remedy 2 and it requires
immediate improvement.
cies provide less return than revenues derived from the generality of its
customers. .. ." Id. The Public Service Commission (P.S.C.) in In re
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York Inc., 85 P.U.R.3d 276, 281 (1970),
held that Con Edison's revenues should be adjusted upward in rate pro-
ceeding to reflect the P.S.C.'s rejection of a special discount rate for large
volume usage.
37. Regulatory Alternative 478. "[R]evenues sufficient to increase the
return on the special contracts to reasonable levels are imputed to the
company." Id.
38. Power Complaints, 1973 P.S.C. ANN. REP. 59. "Since late 1970, the
company has been reading residential meters only every other month, with
interim month's bills based on estimated consumption. When a meter
cannot be read as scheduled, estimated bills are rendered for all the inter-
vening months. When a meter is eventually read, the adjustment from
estimated to actual consumption is made at one time and this often results
in an unexpectedly high bill that leads to a complaint." Id.
39. Regulatory Alternative 532. "Electric and gas service is metered,
and billing problems sometimes develop as a result of inaccurate meters,
improper meter readings, or inadequate estimating procedures." Id.
40. "A chronic customer-relations problem is 'seriously affecting the
image of the company and influencing attitudes and actions of outside
agencies.' " N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1975, at 37, col. 7.
41. Power Complaints, 1973 P.S.C. ANN. REP. 59. "Staff investigations
of complaints in 1973 resulted in about 4,800 refunds and bill adjustments
approaching an aggregate of $1.4 million. The number and amount of
refunds reflected upward trends. In 1972, there were about 3,000 refunds
totalling about $960,000." Id.
42. N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1975, at 27, col. 2. "In discussing Con Edison's
customer service problems, the consultant's [Arthur D. Little, Inc.] study
said that many of the complaints were related to problems beyond the
1975]
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III. The Crisis of the Money Market
Utilities' capital investment greatly exceeds annual revenues.43
They depend on a huge inflow of outside capital to finance expan-
sion, provide services, and meet financial obligations." These fiscal
needs must be satisfied in a capital market particularly unreceptive
to new bond and common stock issues of utilities.45 In light of the
market's mood Con Edison's problem is especially acute. It must
raise enough funds to retire previous obligations while financing its
capital expansion program. Beginning in 1977 and continuing until
2002, Con Edison bonds will reach maturity and be refunded at an
average rate of $50 to $100 million per year.4" Construction expendi-
company's control. . . . But the study said much could be done to reduce
errors, eliminate the complaint backlog and improve the treatment of dis-
satisfied customers." Id.
43. Rates & the Economy-Rate Making, 1973 P.S.C. ANN. REP. 23-24.
"The total investment in utilities range from 2 times annual revenues (for
natural gas) to 4.25 times (for water); in between are telephone, 2.95 times
and electric, 3.92 times." Id. at 24.
44. McDiarmid, Public Utilities on the Ropes, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept.
12, 1974, at 31, 33 [hereinafter cited as Public Utilities on the Ropes]. The
utility industry has always been dependent on external sources for capital.
"It has been estimated that about 45 percent of all new securities sold in
this country in the past five years have been marketed on behalf of public
utilities." Id. Utilities depend on external sources because they can't gen-
erate sufficient funds internally. "The utility can generate internally funds
equal to about 4 or 5 per cent of their net plant. . . . [W]hen capital
expenditures rise to 12 or 15 per cent of existing net plant, as in the 1970's,
there is no parallel rise in the internally generated funds, hence the latter
will account for only 25 or 35 per cent of capital expenditures, while the
rest must be raised externally." Utility Financing Problems 21.
45. Financial News and Comment, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 12, 1974, at
41. The unreceptive mood of the market is reflected in its reaction to
Boston Edison's recent bond issue. "Boston Edison Company felt this
impact [the flight of investors en masse into quality items and away from
lower ranked merchandise] . . . when it attempted to sell $60 million of
triple-B five-year bonds with a 12 1/2 per cent coupon rate to yield 12.13
per cent. Although the issue was totally placed during the day, it got off
to a very-slow reception. . . . Only 4 years ago, the Massachusetts utility
was ranked triple-A by the rating agencies ... " Id.
46. 1973 CON EDISON ANN. REP. 27.
[Vol. III
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tures for the next four years will also be staggering. 7 The probable
consequence of an inability to raise the necessary capital is a failure
to meet future consumer needs." The factors which have discour-
aged investor confidence are analyzed in the following sections.
A. Construction Costs and Environmental Litigation
It is technologically impossible to store electricity on a large
scale.49 Thus, utilities must have sufficient generating capacity to
meet peaks in demand.'" Due to a shortage in generating capacity,
Con Edison purchases approximately 20 percent of its electric needs
from other utilities." It is in Con Edison's best interests to expand
and modernize its generating capacity to meet this demand. How-
ever, construction costs,5" environmental, and financial difficulties
have contributed to the present situation in which Con Edison does
not plan to build any new nuclear facilities. 3
In 1971, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held, in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee Inc. v.
47. Id. at 26. "Construction expenditures for the years 1974 through
1978 are estimated to aggregate approximately $3,461,000,000 . . . .Id.
48. Id. "If the Company should be unable to obtain the necessary fi-
nancing, its construction program would be delayed, or sharply curtailed,
which in turn would impair the ability of the Company to meet the future
needs of its customers. In some instances the Company would also incur
financial penalties in the event of premature termination of construction
projects." Id.
49. Regulatory Alternative 495.
50. Id. at 495. "Peak demand" is the period of highest customer de-
mand during a specified period. "On-peak usage" occurs when the cus-
tomer is using power at a time when customer demand for power is the
greatest. On-peak usage "requires the incurrence of the largest part of the
electric utility's cost." Id. at 496.
51. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
52. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 8-9. Construction expenditures in 1973 were
$685,622,690. In 1969 the total was $304,953,416. Id.
53. Note F-Commitments and Contingent Liabilities, 1973 CON EDI-
SON ANN. REP. 26. "In October 1972 the Company [Con Edison] withdrew
its application for a license to construct a nuclear generating plant at
Verplanck, New York . . . . [T]he Company presently estimates that
the net unrecoverable cost resulting from termination of proposed con-
struction of this unit at Verplanck is $11,674,000." Id.
1975]
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AEC,54 that section 102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA)55 required:
responsible officials of all agencies [to] prepare a 'detailed statement' cover-
ing the impact of particular actions on the environment, the environmental
costs which might be avoided, and alternative measures which might alter
the cost-benefit equation."o
The requirement of an environmental impact statement prior to
construction of utility facilities was upheld in Citizens for Clean Air,
Inc. v. Corps of Engineers.5 7 Here the federal district court invalida-
ted an Army Corps of Engineers" permit to Con Edison for the
construction of a water intake and discharge facility for the cooling
system of a proposed power plant because of a failure to evaluate
the environmental effect of such construction. 9
New York State law requires that "[nlo gas corporation or elec-
tric corporation shall begin construction of a gas plant or electric
plant without first having obtained the permission and approval of
the Commission [PSC]".6 ° In addition, state legislation also re-
54. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see Davis, Taming the Technologi-
cal Tyger-The Regulation of the Environmental Effects of Nuclear Power
Plants-A Survey of Some Controversial Issues-Part One, 1 FORDHAM
URBAN L.J. 19, 31-37 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Davis].
55. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-47 (1970).
56. 449 F.2d at 1114 (1971).
57. 349 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
58. See Davis 42-43 for a discussion of the role of the Army Corps of
Engineers with regard to utilities.
59. The grounds for invalidation were failure to comply with the provi-
sions of §102(2)(c) of NEPA (42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(c) (1970)), requiring an
evaluation of the environmental effect of its permit for such construction.
349 F. Supp. at 697. All construction was not enjoined however. In Citizens
for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 356 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
they again tried to enjoin Con Edison from proceeding with construction
of the Astoria No. 6 plant. Citizens for Clean Air claimed that since the
Corps refused to hold a public meeting on the environmental impact state-
ment being prepared, they had violated NEPA and hence the court's prior
order. The court held that since, when a final impact statement was com-
pleted, the Secretary of the Army would decide whether to have public
hearings, it would be premature for the court to order the Secretary to hold
a public hearing. Id. at 21.
60. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 68 (McKinney 1955).
[Vol. II
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quires the approval of the State Board on Electric Generation Siting
and the Environment 6 with respect to the location and construction
of proposed electric power plants.2
The history of Con Edison's Cornwall "pumped storage" plant63
provides an example of the gauntlet New York utilities must run to
increase generating capacity. The Federal Power Commission64 ap-
proved the proposal in 1965.65 The United States Court of Appeals
reversed the decision in 1966.6 The Federal Power Commission ap-
proved a revised proposal in 197067 and the court of appeals af-
firmed.6 Opponents of the project continued their battle in the state
61. Law of May 22, 1972, ch. 385, § 823, [1972] N.Y. Laws 1634 (add-
ing article VIII, enacted as N.Y. PuB. SERV. LAW §§ 140-49b (McKinney
Supp. 1974)).
62. N.Y. Pun. SERV. LAW § 141(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974) requires that
"[n]o persons shall . . . commence the preparation of a site for, or begin
the construction of, a major steam electric generating facility in the state
without having first obtained a certificate of environmental compatability
and public need issued with respect to such facility by the board."
63. Regulatory Alternative 523. "Nuclear facilities function best at a
constant base load; yet the demand for electricity varies widely. Thus, a
nuclear plant built to meet the average load would produce a surplus
during off-peak hours and run a deficit during peak periods. Pumped stor-
age is designed to use the surplus power generated during off-peak hours
to pump water into an upland reservoir and then to use the power gener-
ated by the downflow of the same water to supplement the capacity of the
nuclear facility during peak periods. Pumped storage also may be used in
conjunction with fossil fuel base load plants." Id.
64. Davis 40. "At the present time, the Federal Power Commission
regulates the electrical industry in three ways: (1) by licensing the use of
hydro power sites on navigable rivers under the federal jurisdiction; (2) by
regulating the wholesale rates of power sold for resale in interstate com-
merce; and (3) by encouraging the inter-connection and co-ordination of
power systems." Id. See Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§791a-828c (1970)(the statutory basis of the FPC); id. §§792-93 (the actual structural and
functional guidelines of the Commission).
65. Consolidated Edison Co., 33 F.P.C. 428 (1965).
66. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
67. Consolidated Edison Co., 44 F.P.C. 350 (1970).
68. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972).
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courts, contesting the validity of a water discharge permit granted
by the New York State Department of Environmental Conserva-
tion. 9 The result is that the first contracts for the Cornwall project
were let in 1973, with completion scheduled for 1978-80. The Corn-
wall project was first proposed in 1962.
Since construction of new generating facilities is subject to innu-
merable delays, Con Edison has increasingly relied on purchased
power 0 and has been compelled to keep outdated fossil fuel stations
in operation long after they should have been replaced.7' To com-
pound the problem, Con Edison was so short of cash after the omis-
sion of its quarterly dividend in April, 1974 that it is negotiating the
sale of two large uncompleted power plants-the Astoria No. 6 (fos-
sil fuel) plant and the Indian Point No. 3 (nuclear) plant-to the
Power Authority of the State of New York (PASNY).72
B. Raising Capital Through Debt
To an extent, the hostility of the capital market to new utility
bond issues can be traced to Con Edison's dividend omission." The
impact of this hostility has been reflected in massive downgrading
of utility issues by rating agencies.74 Experts foresee a continuation
69. In re deRham, 69 Misc. 2d 1, 330 N.Y.S.2d 71 (Sup. Ct.), modified,
39 App. Div. 2d 302, 333 N.Y.S.2d 771 (3d Dep't 1972).
70. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
71. See note 4 supra and accompanying text. Even after overhauling,
such stations "rank low in reliability, high in cost, high in environmental
damage, and low in efficient fuel utilization." Regulatory Alternative 525.
72. Public Utilities on the Ropes 31. PASNY "will pay for them [the
plants] and complete their construction through the sale of tax-exempt
bonds." Id. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1001-a (McKinney Supp. 1974) grants
the Power Authority of the State of New York (PASNY) the power to
purchase these plants. "The authority should be authorized to acquire
completed or partially completed generation, transmission and related
facilities and fuel and fuel contracts." Id. § 1001-a(3). See id. § 1005 (the
powers and duties of PASNY).
73. Financial News and Comment, Bond Market Stabilizes, but Utility
Offerings Meet Resistance, PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 4, 1974, at 39. "[Mlost
new issues [utility corporate bonds] still seem to suffer from the emo-
tional overflow by investors following the April Con Ed dividend omis-
sion. . . . [T]he majority of utility offerings were greeted warily by inves-
tors." Id.
74. Financial News and Comment, Rating Agencies Continue Massive
[Vol. III
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of this trend."5 This downgrading has caused a corresponding rise in
interest rates,"6 which has a detrimental effect on the interest cover-
age ratio-"the ratio of income (before payment of interest and
taxes) to interest-bearing obligations.""
The indentures of previously issued bonds prohibit utilities from
issuing additional bonds when the coverage ratio falls below a given
level." Many utilities are approaching or have reached the point
where they are legally prohibited from selling additional bonds.79
Although Con Edison has an unusually low coverage ratio in its
bond indentures, 0 a continued rise in interest rates could force it to
rely heavily on new issues of common stock rather than debt.8 '
Downgrading of Utility Issues, PuB. UTL. FORT., Aug. 15, 1974, at 38.
"Thus far, in 1974 Standard & Poor's has downrated 15 utility bond issues,
bringing the total downrated since 1970 to 67 operating companies." Id.
75. Id. "The marked decline in the financial condition of the electric
utility industry in recent months led officials. . . to predict a continuation
of this trend." Id.
76. Public Utilities on the Ropes 33. "Electric utility bonds of a given
rating now sell to yield at least one per cent more than industrial bonds
carrying the same rating." Id.
77. Utility Financing Problems 21. "Utility indentures typically re-
quire that earnings available for purposes of paying interest (net earnings
before taxes) must be a designated multiple (typically two) of the interest
requirements of both existing and proposed bonds before any new bonds
may be issued." Regulatory Alternative 485.
78. Utility Financing Problems 21. The coverage ratio is usually two
times income to interest obligations. Id.
79. Id. "Moreover, as utilities continue to sell some new bonds at
today's very high interest rates, the coverage ratios will tend to decline
even more rapidly . . . ." Id.
80. 1973 CON EDISON ANN. REP. 27. "Under the Company's Mortgage
Trust Indenture, additional bonds can only be issued, subject to minor
exceptions, if the ratio of the Company's 'net earnings as available for
interest' . . . for a period of twelve consecutive calendar months within the
immediately preceding fifteen calendar months to its 'annual interest
charges' . . . is equal to at least 1.75." Id.
81. Utility Financing Problems 21. The relationship of higher interest
rates to lower coverage ratio to lower ratings and in turn to higher interest
rates is circular in nature. "Higher interest rates automatically reduce the
coverage of fixed charges. Lower bond coverage ratios can lead to lower
ratings on bonds and this increases the company's interest costs which
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Another trend in the utility bond market is for shorter terms to
maturity. Utilities traditionally have a preference for long-term
debt.82 During a period of inflation, the market is not willing to
commit itself to such debt 83 since borrowers' credit ratings change
and interest rates fluctuate. Utilities must now contend with the
continuing pressure caused by short-term bonds.
Con Edison has had to wrestle with the effects of short-term bor-
rowing for years because of its use of "arrearage financing."', Under
arrearage financing, the utility is statutorily required8 to use short-
term loans from banks unless the PSC permits it to do otherwise.
When it reaches the end of its short-term credit line, it can then
further reduces the bond coverage ratio." Leason, Capitalism's Greatest
Test: The Electric Utilities, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 15, 1974, at 31
[hereinafter cited as Capitalism's Greatest Test].
82. Lerner, Impact of Competition on Rate of Return, PUB. UwHL. FORT.,
Dec. 5, 1974, at 28, 30. "[F]irms have a preference for long-term as op-
posed to short-term debt because it places less continuing pressure on the
firm's daily cash position. Unfortunately, during a period of inflation, it is
extremely difficult for any firm to reduce its financial risk exposure by
lengthening the maturity of its debt; rather, all of the pressures on both
lenders and borrowers are to shorten the maturity." Id.
83. Id. "As interest rates rise, capital losses are incurred on outstanding
instruments. Lenders therefore become reluctant to commit new funds on
a long-term basis at any rate that is less than an acceptable real rate, plus
the expected rate of inflation." Id.
84. Regulatory Alternative 473. "All external financing by New York
utilities, other than short-term borrowing, must be approved by the Public
Service Commission." Id.
85. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 69 (McKinney Supp. 1974) provides: "A gas
corporation or electric corporation organized or existing . . . under or by
virtue of the laws of the State of New York, may issue stocks, bonds, notes
or other evidences of indebtedness payable at periods of more than twelve
months after the date thereof. . . provided and not otherwise that there
shall have been secured from the commission an order authorizing such
issue, and the amount thereof, and stating the purposes to which the issue
or proceeds thereof are to be applied. . . . Such gas corporation or electric
corporation may issue notes . . . payable at periods of not more than
twelve months without such consent; but no such notes shall . . . be re-
funded by any issue of stock or bonds or by any evidences of indebtedness
running for more than twelve months without the consent of the commis-
sion."
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float long-term bonds. This restricts management's flexibility in
responding to favorable market conditions for long-term bonds; by
the time the PSC grants approval, market conditions may have
drastically changed.
Another obstacle which Con Edison faces in seeking external fi-
nancing is the PSC's preference for competitive bidding in the sale
of utility securities."6
The purpose of competitive bidding is to obtain purchasers for
utility issues at the lowest possible interest rates. However, negoti-
ated sales of bonds which often yield a higher rate of return, may
be the only method of attracting sufficient financing. The PSC has
allowed some negotiated sales in the past, 7 and may have to allow
increasing sales in the future.
Sale of preferred stock is another means by which some utilities
attempt to meet their financial requirements. However, salability of
preferred stock is limited by the coverage requirements of old issues,
and by the capitalization ratio of the utility offering it." Thus, it can
offer only limited financial relief.
C. Raising Capital Through Equity
Electric utilities will not be able to finance their projected capital
expenditures without heavy reliance upon new issues of common
stock .8 The basic problem confronting utilities is the sheer quantity
86. Regulatory Alternative 473. Generally the PSC prefers securities
sold at competitive biddings. Sometimes negotiated transactions are per-
mitted. Id.
87. Id.
88. Public Utilities on the Ropes 33. "[Tlhis (sale of preferred stock)
is also a strictly limited possibility, as investors look askance at any utility
with a capital structure consisting of more than about 15 per cent of pre-
ferred stock. Also there are usually earnings coverage requirements limit-
ing the issuance of more preferred." Id. The main problem area with pre-
ferred stock issues in New York would be the earnings coverage require-
ments, since N.Y. combination utilities have a capitalization ratio of 52.4
percent debt, 13.6 percent preferred stock, and 34.0 percent common eq-
uity. 1973 P.S.C. ANN. REP. 24.
89. Utility Financing Problems 21. "Over the next decade the utility
industry will have to raise about $100 billion in the form of common equity
capital. Retained earnings may account for perhaps $25 billion, so that the
remainder will have to be raised by selling new shares of common stock.
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of stock that will have to be sold annually and the fact that the
prices of utility common stocks have been depressed below their
book values90 since Con Edison's dividend omission. 9'
When market price is below book value, "dilution" must be con-
sidered. "Dilution" refers to the immediate impact the sale of new
stock has on a company's earnings per share.92 It is inevitable when
a company sells stock at below book value. 93
The chief fear of prospective purchasers of utility stock is that
"there will be large additional sales of stock in the future, diluting
the value of the stock [they are] considering buying today."94 Com-
panies and regulatory commissions must realize that if senior secur-
ities are now requiring yields in excess of 10 percent, the return on
more risky equity must be appreciably higher to attract new inves-
tors. 5
This means that the industry will have to sell roughly $7.5 billion a year
in new common stock over the next decade, more than 10 times as much
as it sold during the 1960's." Id.
90. Id. at 24-25. "In January,. 1973, virtually every company in the
industry had a market price equal to or above book value. . .; the leading
exception, Consolidated Edison, had a market-to-book ratio of 0.83 (which
is slightly above the average market-to-book ratio for the industry today)."
Id. (emphasis in original).
91. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
92. Utility Financing Problems 22.
93. Id. The following illustration of the relationship between dilution
and below book value market prices was provided: Suppose that an electric
utility has $100 million in common equity capital and sells $20 million
worth of common stock. If its allowed rate of return is 12 percent, then its
earnings will rise from $12 million to $14.4 million, that is, by 20 percent.
But whether the number of shares rises by 20 percent is dependent upon
how many shares the company had to issue to raise $20 million. This is
determined by the price of the stock. Assume that the company prior to
selling the stock had 5 million shares outstanding so that book value was
$20 per share. Now assume that the market value per share is $10. If the
company wants to raise $20 million it must sell 2 million shares of stock.
These 2 million shares raise the number of shares outstanding by 40 per-
cent. Total earnings are raised by only 20 percent. Thus there is a decline
in earnings per share and a decline in the book value of the stock. Id.
94. Id. at 29.
95. Public Utilities on the Ropes 34. "Under present conditions, with
interest rates on highest-grade, long-term utility bonds close to 10 per cent
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IV. Regulatory Commissions
A. Background
Any solution to Con Edison's financial problems requires the in-
volvement of the PSC. The powers given such regulatory commis-
sions have been upheld by the courts. In Munn v. Illinois,9" the
United States Supreme Court held that states could, as a valid
exercise of their police power, regulate industries "affected with a
public interest."97 Smyth v. Ames98 affirmed the constitutionality of
this regulatory power with the caveat that a state must allow the
utility a "fair return" on property devoted to the public service."
The need for regulatory commissions composed of financial and
industrial experts was recognized by the Court when, plagued with
the complexities of determining a "fair return," it observed that an
evaluation of the utilities' profits:
could be more easily determined by.a commission composed of persons whose
special skill, observation and experience qualifies them to so handle great
problems of transportation as to do justice both to the public and to those
whose money has been used to construct and maintain highways for the
convenience and benefit of the people. °10
In 1907 New York and Wisconsin created the first commissions
with comprehensive jurisdiction over utilities."0 ' Similar regulatory
commissions presently exist in every state.'0 These commissions
often share concurrent jurisdiction with federal agencies.103
with those on medium-grade electric utility bonds at 11 per cent or more,
and with electric utility stock selling on average at around 7 times earn-
ings, it is difficult to see how a return on equity of much under 15 per cent
will enable them to raise equity capital without badly damaging the posi-
tion of present stockholders and ultimately drying up the sources of such
capital." Id.
96. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
97. Id. at 126.
98. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
99. Id. at 547.
100. Id. at 527.
101. 1 A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 25 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as PRIEST].
102. Id.
103. "[T]he major federal agencies concerned with interstate aspects
of utility operations ...are (1) the Interstate Commerce Commission
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B. Rate Base
To determine the amount of revenues a utility can receive from
customers, regulatory commissions generally use the following for-
mula: Revenues = Operating Expenses + (Rate Base x Rate of
Return).' 4 A utility's rate base is determined by a valuation of its
assets less accrued depreciation"5 plus an allotment for working
capital, materials, and supplies. 06 The Smyth Court directed that
utility property be accorded "fair value"'0 7 and promulgated six
factors which could be considered in arriving at this goal.' Dispute
has historically centered on which particular method of valuation,
if any, the Court endorsed. 00 Two factors, original cost and repro-
duction cost, have become the critical standards by which rate bases
are determined and around which regulators and the regulated have
(ICC); (2) the Federal Power Commission (FPC); (3) the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB); (4) the Federal Communications Commission (FCC); and
(5) the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)." Id. at 33.
104. Pontz & Sheller, The Consumer Interest-Is it Being Protected by
the Public Utility Commission?, 45 TEMPLE L.Q. 315, 316 (1972).
105. C. PHILLIPS, JR., THE EcONOMICS OF REGULATION 216-17 (rev. ed.
1969) [hereinafter cited as PHILLIPS]. The four categories of assets in-
cluded in the rate base are tangible assets, incidentals during construction,
working capital, and intangible assets. Tangible assets include "used and
useful" land, buildings, and equipment (plant). Incidentals during con-
struction are administration, brokerage, legal and promotional fees, inter-
est, insurance, taxes, and contingencies. Working capital includes money
needed to meet current obligations. Intangibles include good will, franchise
value, water rights, leaseholds, and going concern value. Id. at 217.
106. PRIEST 191.
107. 169 U.S. at 546.
108. "[Tlhe original cost of construction, the amount expended in
permanent improvements, the amount and market value of its bonds and
stock, the present as compared with the original cost of construction, the
probable earning capacity of the property under particular rates prescribed
by statute, and the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all mat-
ters for consideration, and are to be given such weight as may be just and
right in each case." Id. at 546-47. See also PHILLIPS 220-21 & nn.10-13 for
discussion of the merits, application, and court treatment of each stan-
dard.
109. Of these six tests four were ultimately rejected and as a result
original cost and reproduction cost have become the surviving standards.
PHILLIPS 220-21 & nn.10-13.
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remained in juxtaposition.10 The original cost method allows the
investors the amount spent upon the asset at the time it was ac-
quired.' The fair value method allows consideration of factors other
than the original cost of the asset, including inflation, changing
economic conditions, and the cost of duplicating the exact same
plant in the year of valuation."' As a result, this method of valuing
utility assets has been criticized as being subjective and specula-
tive." 3
Decisions following Smyth have interpreted the "fair value" test
to require reproduction cost consideration."' There is serious ques-
tion, however, whether the Smyth Court intended to require repro-
duction cost as one of the elements in arriving at "fair value" or was
merely giving an example of a possible consideration in a reason-
110. Id.
111. Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. PSC, 262 U.S. 276
(1923). "The thing devoted by the investor to the public use is not specific
property. . . but capital embarked in the enterprise. Upon the capital so
invested the Federal Constitution guarantees to the utility the opportunity
to earn a fair return." Id. at 290.
112. McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400, 408-10 (1926);
PRIEST 156-166. The Supreme Court of Delaware has held that fair value
in that state means "'present' fair value, that its commission must give
to 'each element of value such weight as may be necessary and proper
under the facts presented . . . . '" Id. at 157.
113. West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662 (1935). "In
assuming the task of determining judicially the present fair replacement
value of the vast properties of public utilities, courts have been projected
into the most speculative undertaking imposed upon them in the entire
history of English jurisprudence. . . . When we arrive at a theoretical
value based upon such uncertain and fugitive data we gain at best only
an illusory certainty." Id. at 689 (Stone, J., dissenting).
114. McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400, 408-10 (1926);
Galveston Elec. Co. v. Galveston, 258 U.S. 388 (1922). In a concurring
opinion in FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942), Justice
Douglas interpreted Smyth, stating: "We think this is an appropriate occa-
sion to lay the ghost of Smyth v. Ames [to rest]. . . ." Id. at 602. "As
we read the opinion of the Court, the Commission is now freed from the
compulsion of admitting evidence on reproduction cost or of giving any
weight to that element of fair value. The Commission may now adopt, if
it chooses, prudent investment as a rate base-the base long advocated by
Mr. Justice Brandeis." Id. at 606.
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ableness test."5 In FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co.," 6 the Court held
that the Federal Power Commission (FPC) was not bound by Smyth
to consider reproduction cost in arriving at the "fair value" of a
utility's assets."7 The Court upheld the FPC's endorsement of origi-
nal cost. Currently, state jurisdictions are split almost equally be-
tween "fair value" and original cost."' "New York has a foot in
either camp. ' "" Legislation requires the PSC to value electric com-
panies at original cost; however, reproduction cost may be consid-
ered in appraising other utilities.' °
Property, to be included in the rate base, must be "used and
useful,"'"' or older property used irregularly;' newer property not
yet operative will generally be excluded.' Property acquired by
contribution is not usually included in the rate base' 4 and property
purchased second hand from another public utility is not generally
valued in excess of the cost of the property when first acquired by
the original owner.'25
115. PHILLIPS 221. See also Priest, Major Public Utility Decisions in
Perspective, 46 VA. L. REV. 1327 (1960).
116. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
117. Id. at 605.
118. PRIEST 166.
119. Id. at 153.
120. N.Y. PUB. SEav. LAW § 97(1) (McKinney 1955) (fair value); cf. id.
§§ 72, 89-j (return upon capital actually expended).
121. PRIEST 174-75.
122. Long Island Lighting Co., 18 P.U.R. (n.s.) 65, 77-78 (N.Y. Dep't
Pub. Serv. 1935).
123. Duke Power Co., 99 P.U.R.3d 321, 354, (N.C. Util. Comm'n 1973);
cf. Remarks of Joseph C. Swidler, Chairman, New York State Public Serv-
ice Commission, New York Society of Security Analysts Annual Banquet,
Jan. 31, 1973, at 10. In a recent case, Rochester Gas & Elec. Co.,
- P.S.C. Rep. - (1972) the P.S.C. allowed a non-revenue produc-
ing environmental research plant which was constructed during the test
year but which wasn't yet operative into the rate base. The P.S.C. also
permitted the inclusion of a plant under similar circumstances where the
plant was inoperative because of a natural gas shortage and the burden on
the utility's finances consumed revenue needed for further capital expan-
sion.
124. PRIEST 177.
125. Id. at 188-89; see Utilities & Indus. Corp., 43 P.U.R.3d 330, 332-
33 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1962).
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A controversy exists as to whether interest on money raised during
construction of a new plant should be included in the new plant's
rate base. 6 Some jurisdictions question the legitimacy of this cost 27
while in other jurisdictions, such as New York, under set conditions,
the cost is included. 2 8
Working capital, included in the rate base, 2 ' is the money needed
to discharge the corporation's normal daily expense.' The amount
of working capital is finally determined by the commissions. In the
1950s and 1960s there were occassions when commissions, wary of
excess utility profits, discounted working capital in order to insure
an accurate valuation of the companies' assets. 3'
Materials and supplies are tangible assets expended regularly in
the operation of the business. This stockpile is essential in the daily
course of business and is universally recognized as a legitimate part
of the rate base. 3 2
Accelerated or liberalized depreciation methods permit utilities
to defer tax payments. 3 3 When the utilities devoted this money to
126. See, e.g., PRIEST 178-80.
127. Id.
128. Consolidated Edison Co., 96 P.U.R. (n.s.) 194, 380-81 (N.Y. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1952). "With minor deviations, the general rule followed by
regulatory authorities in treating plant under construction, to which inter-
est has been added as an element of cost, is that such property should not
be included in a rate determination unless the operating income of the
utility is adjusted to reflect the resultant effect of the property involved,
or unless the interest charges are included as an operating revenue. The
principal reasons stated in support of this standard are: (1) the property
involved is not presently used and useful in the rendition of public service,
(2) neither the company nor the customer derives any benefit until the
property becomes productive, (3) the inclusion of interest as an element
of property costs avoids burdening a utility's net income with the cost of
construction funds, with the result that a utility is compensated for the use
of such funds during the construction period of new facilities." Id. at 380-
81.
129. PRIEST 183-87.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 184-85 contains an extreme example of discounting working
capital allowance by the California Public Service Commission.
132. Id. at 183.
133. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167(b).
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capital expenditures an immediate controversy arose as to whether
the investors or the consumers should enjoy the benefit of these
savings.'34 The FPC "flowed through" the benefits to consumers in
a landmark decision in 1966. 31 This decision and the cases which
followed have become the standard which has guided many state
commissions. 3 ' New York adheres to the flow through policy.137 Crit-
ics of this policy have asserted that greater savings to both the
investor and the consumers would be derived by allowing utilities
the use of this money to provide needed additional plant and equip-
ment.
38
C. Rates of Return
The rate of return is a percentage figure' which, when multiplied
by the rate base 140 and added thereafter to operating costs should
produce a "fair return" to the utility.'
The Supreme Court has promulgated two criteria by which regu-
lators may determine a fair rate of return.' The investor-owned
utility should be allowed to earn a return similar to unregulated
industry with "corresponding risks and uncertainties.' 4 3 Further-
more, "[t]he return should be . . . sufficient to assure confidence
in the financial soundness of the utility . . . maintain . . . [its]
credit and enable it to raise the money necessary [to attract capi-
134. PRIEST 124-38. See also 66 HARv. L. REV. 1274 (1953).
135. Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 359 F.2d 318, 344
(5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 847 (1967). The Court has noted
several factors which indicate that the Alabama-Tennessee case was an
extremely inappropriate set of circumstances upon which to formulate
such a major regulatory decision.
136. PRIEST 130-34.
137. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 28 P.U.R.3d 171, 193 (N.Y. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1959).
138. In re Accounting and Rate Case Treatment of Liberalized De-
preciation, 49 P.U.R.3d 1, 34 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1963).
139. PRIEST 139.
140. See text accompanying notes 104-05 supra.
141. Willcox v. Consol. Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 48-50 (1909).
142. Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. PSC, 262 U.S. 679,
692-93, (1923).
143. Id. at 692.
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tall. .... "'I The latter criteria must be the primary consideration
of the commissions if investor-owned utilities are to be viable enter-
prises. 5
Prior to the present high interest rates, the utilities had no major
problems borrowing.' Because electric utilities are capital inten-
sive,'47 their continuation depends upon being able to retire present
debt and reissue new debt. Con Edison requires $3.92 worth of capi-
tal to produce $1 worth of revenue."'
When setting the maximum rate of return that utilities will have
the opportunity to earn, the commissions have not adequately con-
sidered the effect of new construction."' If a new plant is brought
"on line" the utility's rate base will increase, but revenues will
remain relatively static because the new plant is serving the same
customers and has been constructed to replace older and obsolete
facilities. The resulting effect is called attrition and refers to the
erosion of the rate of return. 150 The effect of attrition can be illus-
trated by the following example:
Suppose the commission sets a company's rate base at $10 million and allows
a 6 percent rate of return, resulting in annual earnings of $600,000. If, how-
ever, the company completes construction of a $1 million new plant and puts
it into operation during the next year, and . ..total earnings increase to
$627,000, the rate of return will be 5.70 percent."'
Typically, the problem is precipitated by rising construction costs
and a rate of return fixed prior to the year the plant is included in
144. Id. at 693.
145. PRIEST 194-95, 210.
146. Id. at 218. "The fabulous 1940's and the early 1950's, when utili-
ties sliced multi-millions from their interest requirements by calling five
per cent bonds and issuing three per cent bonds to replace them, have been
turned upside down." Id. at 219-20.
147. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
148. 1973 P.S.C. ANN. REP. 24.
149. See text sections i & II supra.
150. PHLiPS 243. "'[Attrition is] the tendency of the rate of return
to diminish in a period of comparatively high construction costs, since
new plant is being added which. . . is relatively expensive. . . .As the
high cost plant comes into service, it tends to increase the applicable rate
base at a more rapid pace than the resultant earnings, and the rate of
return decreases accordingly.'" Id.
151. Id.
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the rate base. Possible solutions to attrition are to permit a special
allowance for "start-up" costs or to allow other increases in rates to
offset the added costs.
D. Regulatory Lag
Regulatory lag is a word of art in utility regulation. It is the period
between a utility's request for higher rates and the commission's
decision whether such increases are justified.'52 Hearings must be
held in nearly every instance that a utility requests an increase.'53
In New York this review period is limited by law to ten months. 54
If a determination by the PSC is not made within the statutory
period, the utility's proposed rates go into effect unless the commis-
sion sets interim rates.'55 Rather than allow a utility to achieve a
rate increase by default, the commission will invariably post interim
rates. "' Interim rates will otherwise be granted only in special cir-
cumstances' 7 and are invariably lower than the permanent rates
which will probably be granted.' Before interim rates may be lev-
ied, there must be a limited hearing for customers who may be
adversely affected.' 9
152. Regulatory Alternative 492. Regulatory lag and attrition are of the
same genus, attrition being that type of regulatory lag attributable to
attempted capital expenditure during a period of static rate of return.
153. Regulatory Alternative 489. "[W]hen a proposed rate change ex-
ceeds both $100,000 . . . and 21/2% of the utility's annual revenues, the
rate change cannot be permitted to become final without a public hear-
ing." Id.; see N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW §§ 66(12), 92(2) (McKinney Supp.
1974). New York requires that hearings must be held before temporary or
interim rates can be posted. Id. § 114 (McKinney 1955).
154. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 113 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
155. Id. §§ 66(12) (gas and electric utilities), 92 (telephone and tele-
graph companies).
156. Regulatory Alternative 490.
157. Id. The special circumstances are: (1) the utility's earnings are so
low that it is losing the ability to attract capital; (2) the investors aren't
getting a fair return guaranteed by law; (3) it is generally conceded by all
parties concerned and affected that the utility needs an increase or de-
serves it. Id.
158. Id. at 491.
159. N.Y. PuB. SEav. LAW § 114 (McKinney 1955) (temporary rates and
hearing requirements). See also Regulatory Alternative 491.
[Vol. III
CON EDISON
The actual time expended for implementation of a rate increase
can be as much as a year.'60 In rate cases, the hearing process per-
mits concerned parties to file briefs, cross-examine company ex-
perts, and submit reply briefs.'" ' The PSC, plagued with staff shor-
tages and greater caseloads, has become a victim of regulatory lag
as much as utilities.'"2 Currently, a utility waits up to twelve months
to get an increase which, when finally awarded, is insufficient.
Thus, the utility must immediately apply for another increase., 3
This nationwide dilemma has prompted President Ford to propose
the Public Utility Act of 1975, which requires, inter alia, that state
regulatory commissions complete all rate increases within five
months." 4 The new chairman of the New York State Public Service
Commission, Alfred E. Kahn, has also proposed a modified five
month implementation plan.' 5
160. Regulatory Alternative 489. See also N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 66(12)
(McKinney Supp. 1974) (utility must give at least 30 days notice of any
proposed change in its filed rates, and must publicize its proposal); 16 NEW
YORK, N.Y., CODE OF RULES & REGS. § 89.1 (1972) (to expedite hearings,
the utility must file its complete direct case in support of its proposed
change). It can logically be surmised from the statutory requirements that
it might take longer than the statutory 10 month period to implement a
rate change. Cf. Regulatory Alternatives 491.
161. Regulatory Alternative 489.
162. N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1975, at 44, cols. 1, 4.
163. Capitalism's Greatest Test 31.
164. N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1975, at 37, col. 4.
165. Remarks of Alfred E. Kahn, Chairman, New York State Public
Service Commission, New York Society of Security Analysts Annual Ban-
quet, Dec. 13, 1974, at 9: "Our statute requires that we act on requests for
rate increases within 11 months after filing, and we always do so. But an
11 month delay, which generally worked to the advantage of the companies
during the '1950's' and '1960's,' can work intolerably to their disadvantage
in a period of rapid inflation; and to the extent this threatens continuity
of service, it works to the disadvantage to [sic] consumers as well. I
recognize, therefore, that we must be willing to consider various possible
ways of accommodating to the new inflation without totally destroying
incentives to efficiency. Speaking only for myself, I am prepared to con-
sider the use of such devices as permitting rate filings automatically to go
into effect on a temporary basis, after a five month period, upon a showing
that the return on equity has fallen below some predetermined zone of
reasonableness."
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Regulatory lag is also evident in the evaluation methods utilized
by the commission in determining utility rates. Utility revenues are
determined by culling figures compiled from any previous consecu-
tive twelve months, called the test year. ' This "test year" method
analyzes the expenses incurred and the revenues accrued in the test
year. "7 Only revenues which are typical and recurring are allowed
in the test year data, and expenses suffered at the end of the year
which are not proven to be recurring are disregarded.'68
New York employs the "test year" method.'" The PSC allows all
operating expenses actually incurred in the test year, including re-
curring year end expenses, to be included in the twelve month test
year.7 0 The "test year" approach assimilates the pitfalls of regula-
tory lag into the valuation method because it examines only figures
which are frozen at the beginning of the commission's review' and
which will probably be outdated by the time that review is com-
pleted.
To mitigate the squeeze that high inflation has put on the utilities
the PSC has postulated reforms in the prescribed valuation formula.
This new approach is a combination test year of six months for
proven or frozen data, and six months for forecast data or informed
estimates.' Thus, when hearings started, half the data would be
166. 1973 P.S.C. ANN. REP. 23; Regulatory Alternative 476-77.
167. PRIEST 181.
168. Regulatory Alternative 478.
169. Regulatory Alternative 477.
170. 1973 P.S.C. ANN. REP. 23. "The test year costs are adjusted for
changes that have since occurred or that are certain to occur after the test
year. The costs include a just and reasonable rate of return in each case."
Id. See also Remarks of Joseph C. Swidler, supra note 123, at 9. "The
historic test year is modified in New York practice by the allowance of
adjustments for known changes in costs such as wage rate increases, and
tax rate increases. For cost of money we have looked ahead-to incorporate
planned issues of securities, and in some cases, we have used capital struc-
tures for which we think the utility should aim. We have also al-
lowed-sometimes even required-the inclusion of costs for new programs,
such as research and gas safety, if it could be determined that such expend-
itures would or should be made and were not included in the test year
costs." Id.
171. Regulatory Alternative 478.
172. Remarks of Joseph C. Swidler, supra note 123, at 8.
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actual, and by the time that the PSC received the hearing exam-
iner's recommendations the remainder of the data would be ac-
tual. "I If the data proved inaccurate, it could be rejected or altered.
This method permits certain contingent or imminent future expen-
ses to be included as "forecast."'' However, the use of the test year
principle, even when modified, roots the conclusions of the PSC in
the past. Chairman Kahn, appointed in 1974, has espoused an even
more innovative method of valuation, the fully-forecast year. 7 5 He
has asserted:
[W]hen we use a totally historic test year, whose every statistic is engraved
in granite, we are nevertheless engaging in projections: we are projecting
those historic conditions into the future period .... The virtue of moving
toward serious consideration of a fully projected test year .. is that it puts
the focus of attention where it belongs [in the future].'
This view is extremely ambitious. If implemented, it would make
serious inroads on the ills of regulatory lag.
F. Rate Structures and Rate Design
The electric utility industry and regulators have developed pat-
173. Id.
174. Id. at 9.
175. In contrast to the historic test year, the fully forecast year would
use past performance of the utility, e.g., gross sales, revenues, rate base,
etc., to project or extrapolate future allowances for revenues, expenses, and
rate base. The historic test year generally allows for future changes for
inflation only through the rate of return. A. Kahn, Chairman of the New
York State Public Service Commission, has maintained that the fully fore-
cast year would vitiate regulatory lag without subjecting regulators and the
consumer to the danger of paying higher unjustified rates. "[Riegulatory
commissions have always been in the business of projecting, whether they
knew it or not. When they use historic test-year statistics . . . they were
in fact projecting. They were assuming that the future would be similar to
the past. It is no more speculative . . . to make the best possible estimates
of future costs when setting future rates; and honesty compels it. Kahn,
Between Theory and Practice: Reflection of a Neophyte Public Utility
Regulator, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 2, 1975, at 30. Another proponent of the
fully forecast year has asserted: "Utilities can project their rate base and
available earnings for a two or three-year period with considerable accu-
racy." Truslow, Overcoming Regulatory Lag The High Cost of a Low Rate
of Return, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 27, 1975, at 35.
176. Id. at.7.
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terns in the prices charged to different classes of customers.'77 Each
classification has a different rate structure. 7 ' The classifications are
typically described as "[riesidential . . . small commercial . . .
general (for industrial, large commercial and government custom-
ers, and multi-residence consumption not separately metered), and
. ..specialized services (street lighting, electric transit . . .and
the like)."'79 Controversy has developed over these patterns, and
rate design has become a possible key to enabling utilities to realize
their proper rate of return.1s°
Historically, New York rates have one charge for the use of the
service and another charge based upon actual consumption.'' Utili-
ties have employed a decreasing block structure which encourages
high consumption with a decreasing charge for each additional kilo-
watt consumed.' While vestiges of this policy still exist, it has been
suspended in residential and small commercial classes.8 3 For large
industrial users, the declining blocks have been decreased or flat-
tened so that the charge per kilowatt is made more equal.8 4 The
need to conserve fuel and the consequential failure of economies of
scale mandate that the declining charges be abandoned. 5 Some
economists have suggested practices which are more drastic than
flattening the rates. The "inverted block" theory would have in-
177. Regulatory Alternative 494.
178. Id.
179. Id. Rate design concepts are influenced by administrative cost,
historical rate patterns, and social welfare considerations. A recent policy
consideration in rate design is the environment and natural resources. Id.
at 497-504. The rate structure tries to distribute costs to the customer
responsible for the expense, but some costs are not assignable. These are
called incremental costs and they are allocated to all the utility's custom-
ers and provide a floor below which prices should not drop. Id. at 496-97.
180. Remarks of Joseph C. Swidler, supra note 123, at 11.
181. Regulatory Alternative 494.
182. Id.
183. 1973 P.S.C. ANN. REP. 25.
184. Id. See generally Regulatory Alternatives 493 n.8 for a list of rele-
vant cases.
185. Cichetti, Electricity Price Regulation: Critical Crossroads or New
Group Participation Sport, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 29, 1974, at 13, 15
[hereinafter cited as Electricity Price Regulation].
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creasing costs as the consumer required more blocks of electricity.186
Another theory, based upon flattening of rates, would offer any price
reductions made possible by excess revenues to the class of con-
sumer that is least likely to increase consumption when offered the
reduction. This has been called the "inverse price elasticity rule."'87
Peak load demand costs require the incurrence of the largest part
of the electric utility's costs.' Electricity cannot be stored under
current technology. Thus, to meet peak demands on the system,
companies are required to maintain obsolete and inefficient equip-
ment at a great cost.' 8 In the alternative, the utility must purchase
power from an outside source.8 0 Because of the difficulties in deter-
mining how much each consumer contributes to the peak load and
the lack of adequate metering,' New York has not as yet instituted
any widespread pricing policy which would increase the consumer's
charge in proportion to the demand he placed on the system at the
time of the system's peak load. However, peak load pricing would
be effected, if the above mentioned problems were solved, by charg-
ing substantially higher rates on peak consumption. This would
have the concurrent benefit of improving the system's load factor.'
The PSC has recently shifted costs to the large commercial users
and has held that in the future unit price discounts for increased
usage will not be approved unless the discount price can be justified
by lower costs."'3 These reforms are a significant step in demanding
that those who consume the most energy and create the greatest
expense for the utility pay for it. The consumer attitudes of the
1960s, accustomed to decreasing blocks and even occasional rate
reductions, must give way to the economic realities of tight money
and expensive energy sources.
186. Id. at 15.
187. Id.
188. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
189. See note 4 supra.
190. See notes 4 & 17 supra.
191. Regulatory Alternative 496.
192. Electricity Price Regulation 16.
193. 1973 P.S.C. ANN. REP. 25.
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V. Proposed Reforms
A. Tax Reforms
The high cost of fuels requires that some alternate method of
generating electricity be developed. New York regulators allow elec-
tric utilities to devote up to one percent of their revenues for re-
search and development and include this in operating expenses." 4
A tax credit for research and development expenditures would fur-
ther stimulate this vital activity and utlimately benefit the public
as well as the utility industry in the form of greater efficiency and
a possible lessening of deleterious environmental effects. For exam-
ple, if tax incentives were to stimulate an accelerated development
of scrubbers, more high sulfur fuel could be burned in New York
City without fear of adverse environmental effects. 195
Prior to the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 (Act),'" utilities were
limited to a four percent investment tax credit9 7 while most Ameri-
can industries were granted a seven percent credit.9 8 The Act per-
mits utilities a ten percent tax credit for the acquisition of qualified
capital equipment.'99 Faced with huge construction requirements,
194. 1973 P.S.C. ANN. REP. 19. "This Commission, foreseeing these
changes in events, expressed its belief that all utilities in the State should
expend at least 1 percent of their revenues for research and developement
as a near term goal." In Consolidated Edison Co., Inc., summarized at 99
P.U.R.3d 538, (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1973), the Commission said: "In
determining the operating expenses of an electric company for rate-making
purposes, an allowance for research and development should be equal to
one per cent of the company's annual revenues." Id.
195. The Energy Crisis, 1973 P.S.C. ANN. REP. 11-12. "Rather than
force the utilities to invest billions of dollars in untried technologies now,
Mr. Swidler said, they should be permitted to build coal-fired generation
where ambient standards can be met, with a deadline for installing scrub-
bers as soon as perfected." Id. at 12.
196. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, §§ 301(b)(1), (2), (3), INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, §§ 46(a)(6), (c)(3)(A), (0(8).
197. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 46(c)(3). In the case of section 38 prop-
erty which is public utility property, the amount of the qualified invest-
ment shall be 4/7 of the amount determined under paragraph (1).
198. Id. § 46(a)(1). The amount of credit shall be equal to 7 percent of
the qualified investment (as defined in subsection (c)).
199. N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1975, § 3, at 1, col. 3: "Utilities would also
get a special advantage. Congress has attached a provision which virtually
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the monetary savings engendered by a ten percent credit should
significantly increase Con Edison's cash flow and improve the finan-
cial integrity of the company.210
Con Edison, already paying approximately three hundred million
dollars annually in local taxes, 01 would be hard pressed if the re-
cently proposed ten percent increase in the New York City real
estate taxes were enacted. 02 Such an increase should be immedi-
ately recognized in the form of an automatic adjustment clause for
taxes.20
B. Valuation Reform
While New York is a "fair value" jurisdiction for certain purposes,
electric utilities are valued at original cost.24 A "fair value" valua-
tion would permit the utility to earn a rate of return based on the
reproduction cost of the old fossil-fuel plant,0 5 but not the cost of
the nuclear plant that will replace it. That cost must be borne by
assures that all utilities can take the full 10 per cent credit without being
forced by the state regulatory agencies to pass savings on to consumers.
And there is another benefit for utilities. For all other corporations the tax
credit could not exceed $25,000 plus 50 per cent of any profit above that
each year. But utilities would be allowed to deduct up to 100 per cent of
taxable profits in both 1975 and 1976. The maximum credit would be
reduced gradually to 50 per cent in 1981."
200. Utilities: Weak Point in the Energy Future, BusiNEss WEEK, Jan.
20, 1975, at 46, 49. "Bigger write-offs on new equipment would provide
greater cash flow and an incentive to invest in new plant."
201. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
202. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1975, at 1, col.4.
203. The Citizens Water-Supply Co., 3 P.U.R.4th 82, 98 (N.Y. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1973). This water utility was allowed to utilize an automatic
adjustment clause for local tax charges. See also Jones, Crisis in Rate
Regulation-The Disappearing Return on Equity, PUB. UTIL. FORT. Oct.
10, 1974, at 76, 79. "During the past year, local governments have received
windfalls because of the substantial increases in the cost of fuel and gas
to the utilities. Revenues from these clauses are meant solely to cover the
increased purchase cost of gas and fuel. There is no reason why the govern-
ment should receive additional tax revenues just because the cost of oil
skyrockets." Id. See note 20 supra for an explanation of how the fuel
adjustment clause operates.
204. See text accompanying note 120 supra.
205. See text accompanying note 112 supra.
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the investor. Nevertheless, "fair value" would ease the transition
from fossil-fuel to new energy sources and ameliorate the costs of
technology.
Another reform which would ease the financial strain of building
new plants is the inclusion of plants under construction in the
rate base. New York recently adopted this reform if certain condi-
tions are met.2 "1 Such a policy recognizes that the heavy burden of
construction costs should be shared, to some extent, by the utility
customer.
C. Financial Reforms
The abolition of arrearage financing, the method by which the
utility exhausts its short-term credit line before it can resort to long-
term debt, would allow utilities the freedom to issue long-term debt
when market conditions appear most favorable. 07 Presently, arrear-
age financing places the utility in a constant state of peril because
the need for capital in the company is greater when credit is less
available. Arrearage financing should be reconsidered and modified
in accord with current economic conditions.
Alfred E. Kahn, Chairman of the PSC, has expressed the belief
that a full forecast year is as accurate and sound in determining rate
base as the "historical test year." 08 The full forecast year is essential
if the PSC is to keep utilities abreast of rapidly increasing costs.
Modern accounting techniques and careful review by the PSC can
insure that the estimated costs embodied in a full forecast test year
will be accurate. The PSC policy of not including estimated rises in
costs until actually incurred, should be modified.2"
206. Consolidated Edison Co., Inc., summarized at 99 P.U.R.3d 562
(N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1973). "Non revenue-producing projects which
included safety and environmentally related expenditures were allowed in
an electric company's rate base." Id.
207. See text section III supra for expanded discussion of arrearage
financing.
208. See quotation accompanying note 176 supra.
209. Remarks of Joseph C. Swidler, supra note 123, at 10. "There are
other differences between the forecast approach and our approach. Fore-
casts may take account of general trends, which in frankness we do not
reflect. Nor do we include predicted changes in wage rates not based on
contract or on changes which have not occurred at the time of our decision.
Partly this is due to their speculative character, and partly to the fact that
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Because of the high cost of equity financing,"'0 the PSC should
increase the rate of return permitted to utilities. With a prime inter-
est rate of approximately 7 percent, a rate of return on equity fi-
nancing of less than 15 percent is insufficient to attract investors,
D. Conservation Reforms
Since the utility industry is hard pressed by the rising demand
for electricity, it is desireable that new techniques be implemented
to slow this ever increasing demand. The PSC has recently set cer-
tain minimum standards for insulation which must be met before
any residence may receive gas heating service."' Such insulation
standards should be applied to other newly constructed buildings.
Large electric appliances now account for twenty-five percent of
the total residential electric consumption in New York State. Im-
proving their efficiency would significantly reduce energy consump-
tion without causing a severe hardship on the public.213 Minimal
appliance efficiency standards should be established and enforced
to improve energy conservation.
VI. Conclusion
The inability of utilities to attract needed capital will affect the
entire economy. The consequences which flow from an inability to
attract capital can be camouflaged for a short period by use of
obsolete equipment and purchased power. However, the final re-
sult-a breakdown of the utility and the services it performs-is
inevitable without regulatory reform.
Management is ultimately responsible for making the necessary
decisions to insure economic soundness of the utility, but the PSC,
which is obligated to review various managerial decisions, is also
to allow such increases, however disguised, is an invitation to impose
them. . . .[This modified forecast] is simpler to prepare, review and try,
and decisions based on it are less subject to challenge and judicial rever-
sal."
210. See text section III supra and accompanying notes.
211. See note 95 supra.
212. 1973 P.S.C. ANN. REP. 17.
213. Id. at 18. "The panel [Ad Hoc Committee on Appliance and
Apparatus Efficiency] pointed out that refrigerators, freezers, and
refrigerator-freezers now account for 25 percent of the total residential
electric consumption in the State. . . ." Id.
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partially responsible for any collapse of investor-owned utilities
such as Con Edison.
The alternative to investor-owned utilities is government-
operated utilities. The Power Authority of the State of New York
(PASNY) has continued its steady growth, acquiring the Astoria
No. 6 and Indian Point No. 3 plants from Con Edison. It has also
acquired customers for that energy by becoming the exclusive sup-
plier for various state agencies-including the Metropolitan Transit
Authority and the Port of New York-New Jersey Authority, both
former customers of Con Edison. Such growth suggests that another
segment of private industry will abdicate its function to the govern-
ment.
The role of the PSC becomes critical in these circumstances. If
the PSC continues to regard itself as primarily a consumer advocate
whose only obligation to the utilities is to provide them the oppor-
tunity to earn a rate of return, it ultimately disserves the public as
well as the investors. The PSC must either relinquish many of its
policies that limit management's options to respond to changing
conditions or take an even more active involvement in the daily
affairs of the utilities. Halfway measures only serve to perpetuate a
deteriorating condition.
Con Edison bought cash and time with the sale of two power
plants to the state. Both the cash and time are finite and changes
are needed if Con Edison is to survive. The implementation of a full
forecast year and the ability to pass on escalating costs to the rate
payers are a necessity. Other reforms such as using a modified re-
production valuation, a liberalized tax investment credit and re-
search and development incentives will enable utilities to develop
the technology necessary to harness new energy sources. If investor-
owned utilities cannot put their house in order with these reforms,
government utilities will replace them by default.
Charles A. Testagrossa, Jr.
Dennis F. Tuffin
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